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Abstract
Previous research suggests overlap between brain regions that show task-induced deactivations and those activated during
the performance of social-cognitive tasks. Here, we present results of quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies,
which confirm a statistical convergence in the neural correlates of social and resting state cognition. Based on the idea that
both social and unconstrained cognition might be characterized by introspective processes, which are also thought to be
highly relevant for emotional experiences, a third meta-analysis was performed investigating studies on emotional
processing. By using conjunction analyses across all three sets of studies, we can demonstrate significant overlap of task-
related signal change in dorso-medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex, brain regions that have, indeed, recently been
linked to introspective abilities. Our findings, therefore, provide evidence for the existence of a core neural network, which
shows task-related signal change during socio-emotional tasks and during resting states.
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Introduction
Previous research suggests overlap between those brain regions
that show task-induced deactivations across a wide range of
different fMRI studies (the so-called ‘default mode network’ or
‘resting state’ of brain function; e.g. [1]) and brain regions, which
are activated during the performance of social-cognitive tasks
(often referred to as the ‘mentalizing network’, e.g. [2,3]). The set
of brain areas thus implicated includes medial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and the temporo-parietal
junction. The observed similarities have led to the suggestion that
a relationship may exist between the physiological baseline of the
human brain and a psychological baseline or predisposition for
social cognition, which may be characterized by a reliance on
internally-directed attention or introspective processes (cf. [4–6]).
A close relationship is also thought to exist between activity change
in the ‘default mode network’ and emotional processing (e.g. [7–
9]), which could be related to a close link between emotional
experiences and introspection (e.g. [10]). In this respect, it has
been suggested that introspective competence may initially emerge
from an infant’s social interactions with others and the emotional
experiences made in this context (e.g. [11]). Consequently, our
notion of introspection is one, which sees introspective abilities as a
capacity to attend to one’s own feelings and/or thoughts, which is
to an important degree forged in the process of social interaction.
In the context of neuroimaging studies into socio-emotional and
resting state cognition, we see introspection, thus defined, as a
possible ‘common denominator’ of both socio-emotional and
resting state cognition.
In order to address whether social-cognitive (hereafter: SOC),
resting state (hereafter: DMN) and emotional processing (hereafter:
EMO) rely on a common core network of brain regions we took
the following approach: we used the activation likelihood
estimation (ALE) approach, which allows to statistically investigate
the convergence of published neuroimaging findings on activations
or deactivations to delineate brain regions, that are consistently
activated by social-cognitive and emotional tasks, as well as those
that consistently deactivate following the engagement in a wide
range of other experimental tasks [12–14].
In a first step, the neural correlates of these different processes
(SOC, EMO and DMN) were analyzed separately. In a second
step, conjunction analyses were performed to reveal brain areas,
which show consistent task-related signal change across two sets of
studies. Given the phenomenal and conceptual similarities of
social-cognitive and emotional processes and their allegedly
comparable importance for the understanding of other minds
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(e.g. [15]), we used the conjunction of SOC > EMO to validate
our approach and map out commonalities in task-related brain
activity between the two independent sets of studies. In order to
investigate neurofunctional overlap between social and uncon-
strained cognition, we performed the conjunction of SOC >
DMN. Lastly, and most important for the objective of our study,
a triple conjunction analysis was carried out to investigate
convergence across all three types of studies (SOC > EMO >
DMN) based on the assumption that introspective processes could
be equally relevant across all studies. In order to investigate
whether the core neural network common to all three sets of
studies shows overlap with findings from a recent study by
Fleming et al., which investigated the relationship of gray matter
volume differences and introspective abilities [16], we performed
a minimum conjunction analysis as the intersection of the
statistical maps. In the study by Fleming and colleagues
participants were asked to perform a (two interval, forced choice)
visual judgment task presented near (individually determined)
sensory thresholds and to provide ratings of confidence in their
decisions after each trial. Introspective ability was determined at
an individual level through the construction of type II receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves, which provide a measure
of the ability to link confidence to perceptual performance, i.e. of
being able to (subjectively) report how well one is (objectively)
doing the task.
Methods
Data used for the meta-analysis
Functional imaging experiments for the meta-analyses were
obtained from the BrainMap database [12], which contained, at
the time of analysis, the location of reported activation foci and
associated meta-data of approximately 10,000 neuroimaging
experiments. Of these, only databased functional magnetic
resonance (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET)
studies that reported functional mapping experiments were
considered. The inclusion criteria comprised considering only data
from neurotypicals (i.e. healthy subjects), exclusive consideration
of studies that report coordinates provided in a standard
anatomical reference space (Talairach/Tournoux or MNI) and
reliance on full-brain coverage (versus analyses based on regions
of interest (ROIs) or functional localizers). The exclusion criteria
consisted in non-consideration of neuroimaging experiments that
investigate age, gender, patient groups or drug effects. For
retrieval of the relevant experiments, the BrainMap database was
filtered based on the metadata of the archived experiments that
describe the experimental paradigm used in the respective
experiment as well as the specific mental process isolated by a
given statistical contrast. Behavioural domains (BD) include the
main categories of cognition, action, perception, emotion,
interoception, as well as their related subcategories. The
respective paradigm classes (PC) classify the specific task
employed (a complete list of BDs and PCs can be found at
http://brainmap.org/scribe/). The BDs and PCs together
constitute a complete cognitive taxonomy for the conceptual
distinction of mental processes conceived by leaders of the
neuroscientific community [17]. Furthermore, labels denoting the
characterization of the reported coordinates as task-dependent
activation or deactivation are provided by the BrainMap
metadata for each experiment.
In the current analysis of the DMN, we included all
experiments that reported deactivations relative to a low-level
(resting) baseline, i.e. all experiments providing coordinates for
regions that decreased their activity when subjects were engaged
in an externally structured task (DMN: n= 533), while excluding
those studies, which were part of the other individual meta-
analyses. That is, the individual meta-analyses were based on
independent pools of experiments. Furthermore, we profited from
the BrainMap taxonomy, to identify the sub-pools of the
databased neuroimaging experiments that have been labelled as
being closely related to emotional and social processing,
respectively. Here, the considered studies on emotional process-
ing are defined as pertaining to ‘‘the mental faculty of
experiencing an affective state of consciousness such as joy,
sorrow, fear, hate’’. In particular, facial emotion is thought to be
an evolutionarily shaped adaption that allows for the efficient
transmission of affective states [18]. Experimental psychology has
later detailed that experiencing one’s own and witnessing others’
emotions is closely related to autonomic arousal [19,20].
Importantly, a number of facial emotions are known to be
interculturally stable [21], which underlines the psychological
importance of automatically sharing arousing affective states, that
is, emotions. The considered studies on social processing, on the
other hand, are defined as pertaining to ‘‘the mental faculty
associated with how people process social information, especially
its encoding, storage, retrieval, and application to social
situations’’. Notably, even stimuli with simple geometrical shapes
are perceived as human-like agents if they enact social situations
(e.g. [22]). Also from a developmental perspective, it is known
that neurotypically developing infants have a preference to attend
to social cues (e.g. [23]). Likewise, it is known that memory
encoding and retrieval is biased towards social content, such as
interactions and relationships (e.g. [24,25]), which underscores
the psychological distinctness of social-cognitive processes. In
particular when considering the focus of the current investigation,
i.e., to assess the convergence between social cognition and
unconstrained processing in the ‘‘default mode’’, it is important to
note, that the employed definition of social-cognitive processes
did not include primarily self-referential processing such as self-
evaluations/-descriptions. That is, our meta-analysis on social-
cognitive processing only included studies dealing with the
impression and evaluation of other persons, not the self. This
restriction should be important, as it is well-known that
processing of the self (or close others) shows is supported brain
regions that are discernable from those sustaining social-cognitive
processing focusing on other, unfamiliar people (cf. [26,27]).
Taken together, based on the BrainMap meta-data, we identified
all experiments corresponding to contrasts isolating emotional
processing (EMO: n= 1474) as well as those experiments that
probed social-cognitive processes (SOC: n= 75). For those two
analyses (EMO, SOC) only task-associated activations were
considered.
Meta-analysis algorithm
Meta-analyses were carried out using the revised version [28] of
the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach for coordi-
nate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging results [29,30]. The
algorithm aims at identifying areas showing a statistical conver-
gence of reported activations across different experiments.
Inference is then based on the assessment if this clustering is
higher than expected under the null distribution of a random
spatial association. The key idea behind ALE is to treat the
reported foci not as single points, but rather as centers for 3D
Gaussian probability distributions capturing the spatial uncertainty
associated with each focus. The width of these uncertainty
functions was determined based on empirical data on the
between-subject and between-template variance, which represent
the main components of this uncertainty. Importantly, the applied
Introspective Minds
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algorithm weights the between-subject variance by the number of
examined subjects per study, accommodating the notion that
larger sample sizes should provide more reliable approximations of
the ‘true’ activation effect and should therefore be modelled by
‘tighted’ Gaussian distributions [28].
The probabilities of all activation foci in a given experiment
were combined for each voxel, resulting in a modelled activation
map (MA map). Taking the union across these MA maps yields
voxel-wise ALE scores describing the convergence of results at
each particular location. Since neurophysiologically, neuronal
effects should predominantly be localized within the grey matter,
all analyses were restricted to those voxels where a probability of at
least 10% for grey matter could be assumed based on the
International Consortium of Brain Mapping (ICBM) tissue
probability maps. To distinguish ‘true’ convergence between
studies from random convergence, i.e., noise, ALE scores were
compared to an empirical null-distribution reflecting a random
spatial association between experiments. Hereby, a random-effects
inference is invoked, focusing on inference on the above-chance
convergence between studies, not clustering of foci within a
particular study. Computationally, deriving this null-hypothesis
involved sampling a voxel at random from each of the MA maps
and taking the union of these values in the same manner as done
for the (spatially contingent) voxels in the true analysis. The p-
value of a ‘true’ ALE was then given by the proportion of equal or
higher values obtained under the null-distribution. The resulting
non-parametric p-values for each meta-analysis were thresholded
at a cluster-level family wise error (FWE) corrected threshold of
p,0.05 and transformed into Z-scores for display.
Conjunction analyses between the separate meta-analyses were
carried out by calculating a voxel-wise minimum statistic [31].
Computationally, this is equivalent to determining the intersection
between the thresholded meta-analyses results (cf. [32]). Results
were thus significant in individual analyses at a corrected p,0.05.
The resulting areas were anatomically labelled by reference to
probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps of the human brain [33,34].
In order to formally test whether the core ‘introspection
network’ - represented by the results of our triple conjunction
analysis (SOC > EMO > DMN) – shows anatomical overlap with
the findings from the study by Fleming and colleagues [16], which
investigated the relationship of grey matter differences and
introspective abilities, a minimum conjunction analysis was
computed as the intersection of the thresholded statistical
parametric maps.
Results
Individual meta-analyses
‘Social-cognitive network’ (SOC). Consistent activation
across the social-cognitive tasks was found in left dorso-medial
prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the left precuneus, bilateral middle
temporal gyrus, anterior temporal cortex (ATC) and the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) area as well as the left superior frontal gyrus
(Figure 1, Table 1).
‘Emotional processing network’ (EMO). Consistent
activation across the emotional processing tasks was found in the
amygdala (AMY) bilaterally, the ventral (VS) and dorsal striatum
(DS) bilaterally, middle and superior temporal gyrus and insular
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) and the precuneus, area V5 and fusiform gyrus (FG)
(Figure 2, Table 2).
‘Default mode network’ (DMN). Consistent task-induced
deactivation was found in PCC extending into the precuneus,
ACC, ventro- and dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral
supramarginal gyrus, bilateral TPJ, left superior and right
middle temporal gyrus, left middle occipital gyrus and left
middle frontal gyrus (Figure 3, Table 3).
Conjunction analyses
Brain regions, which showed consistent activation across both
the emotional and social-cognitive tasks (SOC > EMO), comprise
DMPFC, precuneus, middle and anterior superior temporal gyrus
and VS (Figure 4, Table 4).
Brain regions, which showed consistent involvement both in the
social- cognitive tasks and those studies that investigated the DMN
(SOC > DMN), comprise DMPFC, precuneus and the TPJ
bilaterally (Figure 5, Table 5).
Using a triple conjunction analysis, we formally tested for brain
regions, which show consistent involvement across all different
types of studies, i.e. social-cognitive, emotional processing and
resting state experiments (SOC > EMO > DMN). Results of this
analysis demonstrate the involvement of DMPFC and the
precuneus across these three domains (Figure 6, Table 6).
To assess whether these are the same regions as the ones
reported to underlie introspective abilities (Fleming et al. 2010), we
calculated a minimum conjunction analysis across the thresholded
maps from the triple conjunction analysis and results from the
Figure 1. Significant results of the ALE meta-analysis for social
cognition tasks (SOC). All results are displayed on the left and right
lateral surface view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/ventral view of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) single subject template. ATC:
anterior temporal cortex, DMPFC: dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, MTG:
middle temporal gyrus, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, PREC:
precuneus, TPJ: temporo-parietal junction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g001
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morphometric study by Fleming and colleagues (2010). This
additional analysis, indeed, demonstrates involvement of DMPFC
(MNI coordinates: 23, 54, 21; T= 3.18) and precuneus (MNI
coordinates: 2, 251, 19; T= 3.28), thereby confirming anatomical
overlap between their results and the triple-conjunction of meta-
analyses.
Discussion
Using ALE-based meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies from
the BrainMap database, we were able to demonstrate consistent
patterns of activations and deactivations across different types of
experimental paradigms. Providing such a quantitative assessment
of convergence across studies crucially goes beyond what
qualitative reviews of studies investigating social cognition and
emotional processing can provide. Furthermore, our approach
allows to formally investigate commonalities in the neural
networks subserving different types of tasks by applying conjunc-
tion analyses, which test for convergence across different pairs and
across all three individual meta-analyses. By using the latter type of
analysis, we can demonstrate overlap of task-related signal change
in dorso-medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex, brain
regions that have recently been linked to introspective abilities.
‘Social-cognitive network’ (SOC)
The meta-analysis targeting consistent activations across studies
exploring the neural correlates of social cognition revealed
activations in the DMPFC, the precuneus, the TPJ and anterior
temporal cortex (Figure 1), which is in very good agreement with
previous descriptions of the neural network subserving social
cognition (e.g. [3,27,35]).
More specifically, DMPFC has commonly been related to
mental state attribution or ‘mentalizing’ as e.g. classical false-belief
tasks and stories, which require (cognitively) taking someone else’s
perspective, have been shown to result in a differential increase of
neural activity in this area [36]. Activity of ATC has been related
to the understanding of social concepts [37,38] while activation of
more posterior temporal areas and the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), in particular, have been connected to the perception of
biological motion cues, but also the understanding of intentions
and perspective-taking behavior [27,39,40]. Weighting these
putative functional contributions, activations of the TPJ have
been understood as contributing to the inference of temporary
goals and intentions at a perceptual level, while DMPFC has been
discussed in terms of an integration of social information across
time and at a more abstract level [26]. Recruitment of the
precuneus (and PCC) have been related to the generation of
‘‘internally directed thoughts’’ [41,42], which is likely to be
important for our understanding of the – at least in part –
Table 1. Activation peaks of ALE meta-analysis of the neural correlates of social cognition tasks (SOC).
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates Cluster size Maximum z-score
x y z
Left Superior Medial Gyrus 4 46 32 1083 7.40
Left Precuneus 26 252 28 642 6.67
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 248 259 18 456 5.22
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 253 238 0 385 5.56
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 265 10 259 5.42
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 213 210 236 3.98
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 250 25 219 179 4.60
Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 217 25 55 116 4.31
All peaks were assigned to the most probable brain area by using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.t001
Figure 2. Significant results of the ALE meta-analysis of
emotional processing tasks (EMO). All results are displayed on
the left and right lateral surface view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/
ventral view of the MNI single subject template. ACC: anterior cingulate
cortex, AMY: amygdala, DS: dorsal striatum, FG: fusiform gyrus, INS:
insula cortex, PREC: precuneus, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, VS:
ventral striatum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g002
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unobservable aspects of another person’s mental life. Similarly, the
role of medial parietal lobe in autobiographical memory has been
emphasized by Spreng and Mar, who see overlapping activations
in mentalizing and memory tasks as an indication for the
importance of the role of memory for social cognition, during
which the integration of both personally and interpersonally
available information may be crucial [2].
‘Emotional network’ (EMO)
Our analysis of consistent brain activations for emotional
processing revealed a highly significant, bilateral pattern of
activation, which comprises the AMY, the VS and DS, the
ACC/DMPFC and PCC/precuneus, area V5 and insular cortex
(Figure 2).
Co-activations of ACC and anterior insular cortex bilaterally
have commonly been described as a ‘‘salience network’’ believed
to be involved in the attribution of salience to both internal events
and extrapersonal stimuli, thereby guiding behavior [43–45]. Also,
this network has been implicated in the experience of and empathy
for pain [46,47]. More specifically, anterior insula cortex may be
involved in re-mapping of interoceptive afferences, thus contrib-
uting to integrative representations of feelings from the body
[48,49]. ACC has classically been described as a brain region
involved in the processing of cognitive control and conflict
monitoring [50,51], but more recent data suggests a role as a
‘‘hub where information about reinforcers can be linked to motor
centers responsible for expressing affect and executing goal-
directed behavior’’ [52].
Additionally, our analysis revealed involvement of the bilateral
amygdala, a brain region whose primary function appears to
reside in signaling what is important and to then modulate
appropriate (response) processes to deal with the challenges and
opportunities present in a given situation [53,54]. Neuroanatom-
ically, this appears to be reflected by a multitude of interconnec-
tions of the amygdala and other brain areas [55–57]. Consistent
with the suggestion of the amygdala as an emotional significance
detector, studies have indicated that intact functioning of the
amygdala is important for the generation of adaptive responses
[58] and for the attending of emotionally relevant information
[59,60]. In line with these views, the anatomical volume of the
amygdala has been shown to correlate with the size and
complexity of social networks in adult humans [61].
Finally, our meta-analysis also provides evidence for the
recruitment of the ventral and dorsal striatum during emotional
tasks: while the ventral striatum has been described as a core node
of the neural network of reward, especially involved in the
anticipation and experience of the hedonic aspects of rewards
[62,63]. The dorsal striatum, on the other hand, has been linked to
reward-related aspects of action selection and action release
mechanisms, thereby contributing to reward-based decision-
making (e.g. [64]).
Table 2. Activation peaks of ALE meta-analysis of the neural correlates of emotional processing tasks (EMO).
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates Cluster size Maximum z-score
x y z
Left Amygdala 222 26 214 11445 8.70
Left Superior Medial Gyrus 22 50 20 3636 8.37
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 266 0 1775 8.01
Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus 242 262 210 1357 7.10
Left Precuneus 26 254 20 495 6.12
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 256 234 24 299 4.88
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 240 4 444 5.52
All peaks were assigned to the most probable brain area by using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.t002
Figure 3. Significant results of the ALE meta-analysis of
unconstrained cognition (DMN). All results are displayed on the
left and right lateral surface view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/
ventral view of the MNI single subject template. ACC: anterior cingulate
cortex, MFG: middle frontal gyrus, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, PREC:
precuneus, SMG: supramarginal gyrus, TPJ: temporo-parietal junction,
VMPFC: ventro-medial prefrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g003
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‘Default mode network’ (DMN)
The meta-analysis that explored consistent, task-induced
deactivations across a large number of neuroimaging studies from
different task domains demonstrated involvement of ACC/
DMPFC and PCC/precuneus, VMPFC and TPJ bilaterally
(Figure 3). These results are in line with findings from our own
previous investigation of task-induced deactivations, but also other
analyses, which have repeatedly demonstrated that these brain
regions exhibit task-related decreases in neural activity during
tasks which require engagement with external stimuli [5,12,65,66].
Convergence across the different pairs of meta-analyses
The conjunction analysis of social-cognitive and emotional
processing (SOC > EMO) demonstrates involvement of DMPFC,
the precuneus, middle and anterior superior temporal gyrus and
the ventral striatum (Figure 4). Consistent with intuition of
commonalities of the phenomenal content and construct similar-
ities between social-cognitive and emotional processes, our results,
thus, suggest a common neural network across these two types of
experiments. As many regions in this network (DMPFC, PCC/
precuneus, TPJ) have been implicated as a core network for social
cognition, we would interpret the observed convergence with
emotional processing as strong evidence for the fundamental
contribution of affective information to social cognition [3,26].
Furthermore, our analysis reveals consistent overlap in the ventral
striatum (Figure 4 A1), which has been described as a core element
of the functional neuroanatomy of reward and is thought to be
involved in the anticipation and experience of the hedonic aspects
of rewards (e.g. [62]). The current data is thus in line with recent
evidence suggesting that being able to successfully initiate and lead
social interactions recruits this subcortical brain region and leads
to positive subjective experiences [63]. Also, higher activity in this
brain region in response to social stimuli (such as faces) has been
shown to correlate with increases in reaction time needed by
participants to disengage from a social stimulus [51].
Results of the conjunction analysis between social cognition and
the task-related deactivations (SOC > DMN), demonstrate
involvement of DMPFC, precuneus and the TPJ bilaterally
(Figure 5). Based on this striking convergence between the resting
state and the social cognition network, one could be tempted to
speculate about similarities in the associated cognitive processes.
Indeed, different strands of evidence exist to suggest that human
beings may have a predisposition for thinking about themselves
and others, to which they return when they have nothing else to
think about (see [5]). Recent findings reported by Andrews-Hanna
and colleagues, indeed, lend empirical support to this idea: In their
study, the authors manipulated factors that promote internally
directed, spontaneous cognition separately from those that
influence attention to external task demands. Results demonstrate
Table 3. Activation peaks of ALE meta-analysis of unconstrained cognition (DMN).
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates Cluster size Maximum z-score
x y z
Left Posterior Cingulate Cortex 22 254 24 2383 7.26
Right Mid Orbital Gyrus 4 34 214 1023 8.26
Right Supramarginal Gyrus 56 228 24 711 6.01
Left Superior Medial Gyrus 24 52 10 723 5.64
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 270 18 442 6.29
Left Middle Occipital Gyrus 242 272 22 280 5.61
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 226 18 44 240 6.40
Left SupraMarginal Gyrus 258 234 28 190 4.94
Left Amygdala 222 24 226 122 4.32
All peaks were assigned to the most probable brain area by using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.t003
Figure 4. Significant results of the conjunction analysis of SOC
> EMO. All results are displayed on the left and right lateral surface
view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/ventral view of the MNI single
subject template. DMPFC: dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, PREC:
precuneus, STG: superior temporal gyrus, VS: ventral striatum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30920
that areas of the DMN increased their activity when spontaneous
cognition was maximized [67]. Future research could extend the
use of thought probes and experience sampling during resting state
fMRI measurements in combination with multivariate pattern
analysis techniques to investigate such matters in further detail
[68,69]. The latter approach may also be useful to assess the
commonalities of the cognitive correlates and region-specific
activity changes as well as possible similarities concerning the
neurocomputational formats of social and unconstrained cognition
(cf. [70]).
Convergence across all three meta-analyses
As the key finding of our study, the conjunction analysis
performed by including the results of all individual ALE meta-
analyses (SOC > EMO > DMN) provides compelling empirical
evidence for a shared neural network, which comprises the
precuneus and DMPFC (Figure 6). This analysis was performed
based on the idea that in cognitive terms a commonality may exist
between all three types of states, namely that they may all be
characterized by introspective processing, which could be -at
times- equally relevant for coming to terms with one’s own or
other people’s states. Consistently, the results of the triple
conjunction analysis (Figure 6) converge with findings of a recent
study, which has related structural brain differences in DMPFC
and the precuneus to introspective abilities ([16]; see Figure 3a).
Here, the dorsal part of the MPFC seems to be specifically related
to prospective metacognition [71] – indeed, thinking of oneself in
the context of one’s future behavior would be crucial to our
capacity at social interaction. Consistent with the suggestion of
these two brain regions being relevant for introspection, activity
changes in precuneus have been observed when individuals direct
their attention internally [72]. Similarly, the DMPFC has been
related to the ability of generating stimulus-independent thoughts
to explain aspects of another person’s mental states that might not
be directly observable in their behavior [73]. Both regions have,
therefore, been implicated in the generation of stimulus-indepen-
dent thoughts [74,75]. Furthermore, recent work indicates that
this midline network could be related to automatically tagging the
‘self-relevance’ of stimuli (e.g. [67,76,77]). If this was the case, the
network might play an interestingly dual role in being part of and
shaping bottom-up processes, while at other times also contribut-
ing to the top-down regulation of social behavior by means of
introspective processes. In other words, it may serve as an interface
between neural networks, which subserve internally as compared
to externally directed cognition [42,78]. Thereby, the idea of
introspective processes being related to activity in anterior medial
prefrontal cortex may help to reconcile previous controversy
[74,79], as introspection can be applied to both external and
internal stimuli.
Findings, which suggest that introspection can be enhanced via
social interaction [80], also prompt the intriguing question of the
interrelation of socio-emotional and introspective abilities and
their respective neural correlates. Evidence from developmental
psychology has been taken to suggest that introspective
competence emerges through the infant’s social interactions with
others by relating one’s own states with those of others [11].
Table 4. Activation peaks of conjunction analysis of SOC > EMO.
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates Cluster size Maximum z-score
x y z
Left Superior Medial Gyrus 22 48 28 857 7.21
Left Precuneus 26 254 22 271 5.85
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 256 234 3 211 4.88
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 250 256 16 92 4.03
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 262 6 69 3.73
All peaks were assigned to the most probable brain area by using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.t004
Figure 5. Significant results of the conjunction analysis of SOC
> DMN. All results are displayed on the left and right lateral surface
view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/ventral view of the MNI single
subject template. DMPFC: dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, PREC:
precuneus, TPJ: temporo-parietal junction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g005
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However, a more radical approach holds that it may be only via
social interaction and in virtue of the fact that we are constantly
trying to model other minds in interaction that we learn to be
conscious and develop both an understanding of ourselves [81]
(Carruthers 2009) and a conscious percept of the world at all
[82,83]. In line with the suggestion that activity changes in the
cortical midline structures may primarily be forged during social
interactions before they may be brought under top-down control
and used for ‘offline’ social cognition, a recent fMRI study was
able to demonstrate the recruitment of DMPFC and PCC during
(gaze-based) social interactions including joint attention in the
absence of an explicit mentalizing task [63]. Consequently, one
could speculate that it might be exactly via such (gaze-based)
social interactions, which include deictic elements, that children’s
introspective competence emerges. On the neural level, we
suggest that activity changes in medial prefrontal cortex-posterior
cingulate connectivity - initially not found in infants [84] - are a
likely candidate in terms of the neural correlate of such changes.
The study by Bahrami and colleagues [80] further indicates that
interaction-based changes of introspective abilities continue to be
effective during adulthood.
Taken together, or results suggest that on the neural level,
introspective, social and affective processes converge and rely upon
recruitment of a network that comprises dorso-medial prefrontal
and medial parietal cortex.
Conclusions & Outlook
In this study, we took a meta-analytic approach to delineating
brain regions, which consistently show activations during social
cognition and emotional processing and deactivations across a
wide range of experimental tasks. By applying conjunction
analyses, we demonstrated a close convergence of the brain
regions involved. These results provide robust empirical
evidence for a shared neural network that underlies emotional
processing, social and unconstrained cognition, which localizes
to the precuneus and anterior medial prefrontal cortex. These
two regions are known to be critical hubs in the neurofunctional
architecture of the human brain [1,41,85–89]. Moreover, these
regions have been shown as closely related to introspective
abilities [16]. Crucially, comparing the results of our triple
conjunction analysis to the findings by Fleming and colleagues
demonstrates significant anatomical overlap. Consequently, we
argue that these findings are consistent with the idea that a
‘common denominator’ may exist in cognitive terms, which
could consist in introspective processes. By making use of these,
we may become aware of our own or others’ states, equally
relevant for social cognition, emotional processing and uncon-
strained thought [5,24].
Future research into the functional and effective connectivity of
the different nodes of this shared neural network and its
susceptibility to intervention and plasticity during social interac-
tions are likely to be informative concerning the exact functional
roles of the different brain regions. One important question our
findings raise is whether social cognition, emotional processing,
and resting state cognition simply recruit brain structures that
subtend conscious introspection or meta-cognitive abilities, or
whether they are in fact instrumental in the shaping of such
introspective abilities. One possibility is that in social or emotional
contexts, not only adequate behavior is important, but that the
Table 5. Activation peaks of conjunction analysis of SOC > DMN.
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates Cluster size Maximum z-score
x y z
Left Precuneus 26 254 24 401 5.91
Left Superior Medial Gyrus 22 52 14 195 4.84
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 262 16 101 3.98
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 246 266 18 69 4.15
All peaks were assigned to the most probable brain area by using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.t005
Figure 6. Significant results of the conjunction analysis of SOC
> EMO > DMN. All results are displayed on the left and right lateral
surface view, the anterior/posterior and dorsal/ventral view of the MNI
single subject template. DMPFC: dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, PREC:
precuneus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.g006
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successful prediction and monitoring of the outcomes of this
behavior is equally essential. Such re-description of one’s behavior
could turn out to be exactly the mechanism that underlies
introspection [90–92].
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